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PARTIALLY OBSERVED DISCRETE-TIME RISK-SENSITIVE MEAN
FIELD GAMES ∗
NACI SALDI † , TAMER BAS¸AR ‡ , AND MAXIM RAGINSKY§
Abstract. In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with
the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via
an exponential utility function. In the game model, each agent is weakly coupled with the rest
of the population through its individual cost and state dynamics via the empirical distribution of
states. We establish the mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit using the technique of
converting the underlying original partially observed stochastic control problem to a fully observed
one on the belief space and the dynamic programming principle. Then, we show that the mean-
field equilibrium policy, when adopted by each agent, forms an approximate Nash equilibrium for
games with sufficiently many agents. We first consider finite-horizon cost function, and then, discuss
extension of the result to infinite-horizon cost in the next-to-last section of the paper.
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1. Introduction. Mean-field games have been introduced in [32] and [35] to
show the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for fully observed non-cooperative
continuous time games, when the number of agents is large but finite. The underly-
ing idea of the mean-field method is to transform the decentralized game problem to
a centralized stochastic control problem using the so-called ‘Nash certainty equiva-
lence (NCE) principle’ [32]. The optimal solution of this control problem, calibrated
appropriately using the empirical distribution of the term that (weakly) couples the
players, provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with a sufficiently large
number of agents. To obtain the optimal solution to the associated stochastic control
problem, one should simultaneously solve a Fokker-Planck equation evolving forward
in time and a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolving backward in time. We refer
the reader to [31, 46, 29, 6, 12, 13, 24, 37] for studies of fully-observed continuous-
time mean-field games with different models and cost functions, such as games with
major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, games with Markov jump parameters, and
LQG games.
In this paper, we study discrete-time partially-observed mean-field games with
risk-sensitive optimality criteria. In this model, we have a large but finite number
of agents interacting with each other through their individual dynamics and cost
functions via the mean-field term (i.e., the empirical distribution of their states). It
is known that establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for these types of games is
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quite difficult due to the (almost) decentralized and noisy nature of the information
structure of the problem [4, 3]. Therefore, it is of interest to find an approximate
equilibrium with reduced complexity. To that end, upon letting the number of agents
go to infinity, the mean-field term converges to the distribution of the state of a single
generic agent. This decouples the dynamics and cost functions of the agents from
each other, and because of that, in the limiting case, a generic agent is faced with
a stochastic control problem with a constraint on the distribution of the state at
each time (i.e., a mean-field game problem). The main goal in these problems is to
show the existence of a policy and a state distribution flow such that this policy is an
optimal solution of the stochastic control problem when the total population behavior
is modeled by the state distribution flow and the resulting distribution of each agent’s
state is same as the state distribution flow when the generic agent applies this policy.
This equilibrium condition is called the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle in
the literature. In this paper, we first consider the existence of such an equilibrium for
the limiting case, and then establish that the policy in this equilibrium constitutes an
approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games with sufficiently many agents.
In the literature, partially-observed mean-field games have not been studied much,
especially in the discrete-time setup. Indeed, this work seems to be the first one that
studies discrete-time risk-sensitive mean-field games under partial observations. Prior
works have mostly considered the risk-neutral continuous-time setup. It is obvious
that analyses of continuous-time and discrete-time setups are quite different, requir-
ing different sets of tools. In [30], the authors study a partially-observed continuous-
time mean-field game with linear individual dynamics. In [14, 15, 16], the authors
consider a continuous-time mean-field game with major-minor agents and nonlinear
dynamics where the minor agents can partially observe the state of the major agent.
In [18, 17], the same authors also develop a nonlinear filtering theory for McKean-
Vlasov type stochastic differential equations that arise as the infinite population limit
of the partially-observed differential game of the mean-field type. In [11], the authors
study the linear quadratic mean-field game with major-minor agents where the minor
agents can partially observe the state of the major agent. In [19, 22], the authors
consider the linear quadratic mean-field game, again with major-minor agents where,
in this case, both the minor agents and the major agent can partially observe the state
of the major agent. In [44], the authors study a continuous-time partially observed
stochastic control problem of the mean-field type and establish a maximum principle
to characterize the optimal control. In [28], the authors consider a continuous-time
mean-field game with linear individual dynamics where two types of partial infor-
mation structure are considered: (i) agents cannot observe the white noise which is
common to all agents, (ii) agents can access the additive white-noise version of their
own states.
For risk-sensitive cost criteria, existing works are mostly on the continuous-time
set-up, with [36], discussed further below, being one exception. Now, in continuous-
time set-up, reference [46] studies a class of mean-field games with non-linear in-
dividual dynamics and a risk-sensitive cost function. They characterize the mean-
field equilibrium via coupled HJB and FP equations and explicit solutions to these
equations are given when the individual state dynamics are linear. In [45], the au-
thor considers a continuous-time mean-field game with nonlinear individual dynam-
ics, where state dynamics have Lp-norm structure. Stochastic maximum principle is
used to characterize the optimal solution of the problem. In [20], the authors study a
partially-observed version of the continuous-time risk-sensitive mean-field game. They
establish a stochastic maximum principle for the characterization of the mean-field
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PARTIALLY OBSERVED DISCRETE-TIME RISK-SENSITIVE MEAN FIELD GAMES 3
equilibrium. Reference [38] considers continuous-time risk-sensitive mean-field games
with linear individual dynamics and local state information for the players. First a
generic risk-sensitive optimal control problem is solved which yields mean-field equi-
librium, and then it is shown that the policies in mean-field equilibrium lead to an
approximate Nash equilibrium for games with a sufficiently large number of agents.
It is also shown that this approximate Nash equilibrium is partially equivalent to the
approximate Nash equilibrium of a certain robust mean-field game problem. Finally,
[36] presents the counterparts of these results for the discrete-time linear-quadratic
risk-sensitive mean-field game.
Here, we consider discrete-time mean-field games with Polish state, action, and
observation spaces under risk-sensitive optimality criteria for the players. In the infi-
nite population limit of such games, a generic agent should solve a partially observed
stochastic control problem under the NCE principle. Due to the constraints induced
by NCE principle, common techniques used to analyze partially observed stochastic
control problems are not sufficient. To establish the existence of an equilibrium so-
lution in the infinite population limit, we have to bring in the fixed-point approach
that is used to obtain equilibria in classical game problems, along with the technique
of converting partially observed optimal control problems to fully observed ones on
the belief space. The definitions of the finite-agent game and the mean-field game
problems are given in section 2 and section 3, respectively. In section 4, we prove
the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. In section 5 and section 6, we establish
that the mean-field equilibrium policy is approximately Nash for finite-agent games
with sufficiently many agents. In section 7, we extend previous results to games with
infinite-horizon risk-sensitive cost functions. Section 8 concludes the paper.
In an earlier paper [42], we studied the risk-neutral version of this problem under
a similar set of assumptions on the system components. There are some parallels
between the techniques used in this paper and those in [42] to show the existence of
a mean-field equilibrium and to prove that the policies in mean-field equilibrium pro-
vide an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with large but finitely many agents.
In this paper, we exploit this connection, and refer the reader to [42] for proofs of
certain results. We note, however, that as far as their analyses go, there are con-
siderable technical differences between risk-sensitive and risk-neutral cost functions.
The fact that, in the risk-sensitive case, the cost function is in a multiplicative form
leads to complication in the analysis of the optimality condition. Therefore, to es-
tablish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit and
an approximate Nash equilibrium in the finite-agent case, we need to first transform
the risk-sensitive problem to one where the cost function is risk-neutral and in an
additive form. However, in this risk-neutral form, the one-stage cost function and the
transition probability become non-homogeneous (i.e., time-dependent) as opposed to
the risk-neutral problem in [42]. Hence, after a careful execution of this step, we can
prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium by adapting the technique developed
in [42] to the non-homogeneous and finite-horizon case. We also note that in [43] we
have studied the fully-observed version of the same problem under a slightly different
set of assumptions on the system components. Indeed, to prove the existence of an
approximate Nash equilibrium, here we generalize the results established in [43] to the
game models with expanding state spaces and non-homogeneous system components.
Notation. For a metric space E, we let Cb(E) denote the set of all bounded continuous
real functions on E, and P(E) denote the set of all Borel probability measures on E.
For any E-valued random element x, L(x)( · ) ∈ P(E) denotes the distribution of
x. A sequence {µn} of measures on E is said to converge weakly to a measure µ if
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
4 N. SALDI, T. BAS¸AR, AND M. RAGINSKY∫
E
g(e)µn(de)→
∫
E
g(e)µ(de) for all g ∈ Cb(E). For any ν ∈ P(E) and measurable real
function g on E, we define ν(g) =
∫
gdν. For any subset B of E, we let ∂B and Bc
denote the boundary and complement of B, respectively. The notation v ∼ ν means
that the random element v has distribution ν. Unless otherwise specified, the term
“measurable” will refer to Borel measurability.
2. Finite Player Game Model.
2.1. Original Game Model. Let S, A, and Y be Polish (complete and separable
metric) spaces. We consider a discrete-time partially-observed N -agent mean-field
game with a state space S, an action space A, and an observation space Y. For every
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, the state, the action, and the observation of Agent i at time t
(t = 0, 1, 2, . . .) are respectively denoted by sNi (t) ∈ S, uNi (t) ∈ A, and gNi (t) ∈ Y.
We let d
(N)
t ( · ) = 1N
∑N
i=1 δsNi (t)
( · ) ∈ P(S) denote the empirical distribution of the
states (i.e., mean-field term) at time t, where δs ∈ P(S) is the Dirac measure at s;
that is, δs(A) = 1 if s ∈ A and otherwise 0.
At the initial time step t = 0, the states (sN1 (0), . . . , s
N
N (0)) ∼ κ0 ⊗ . . . ⊗ κ0
are independent and identically distributed according to κ0. For each t ≥ 0, the
current-observations (gN1 (t), . . . , g
N
N (t)) and the next-states (s
N
1 (t+1), . . . , s
N
N(t+1))
are distributed according to the probability laws
N∏
i=1
l
(
dgNi (t)
∣∣sNi (t)) and N∏
i=1
q
(
dsNi (t+ 1)
∣∣sNi (t), uNi (t), d(N)t ),(2.1)
where q : S× A× P(S)→ P(S) is the state transition kernel and l : S→ P(Y) is the
observation kernel. Note that the state dynamics of each agent are weakly coupled
through the mean-field term d
(N)
t .
For any Agent i, define the history spaces G0 = Y and Gt = (Y × A)t × Y for
t = 1, 2, . . ., all endowed with product Borel σ-algebras. A policy for Agent i is a
sequence πi = {πit} of stochastic kernels on A given Gt; that is, for any t ≥ 0,
uNi (t) ∼ πit(·|γNi (t)),
where γNi (t) =
(
gNi (t), u
N
i (t−1), gNi (t−1) . . . , uNi (0), gNi (0)
)
is the observation-action
history observed by Agent i up to time t. The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted
by Πi. Let Π˜i be the set of policies in Πi which only use the observations; that is, π ∈
Π˜i if πt :
∏t
k=0 Y → P(A) for each t ≥ 0. Let Π(N) =
∏N
i=1 Πi and Π˜
(N) =
∏N
i=1 Π˜i.
We let pi(N) = (π1, . . . , πN ) (πi ∈ Πi) denote the N -tuple of joint policies of all the
agents in the game. Under such an N -tuple of policies, the actions of agents at each
time t ≥ 0 are obtained with respect to the conditional probability distribution
N∏
i=1
πit
(
duNi (t)
∣∣γNi (t)).(2.2)
The one-stage cost function for a generic agent is a measurable function m :
S × A × P(S) → [0,∞). Then, the agent’s finite-horizon risk-sensitive cost under a
policy pi(N) ∈ Π(N) is given by
V
(N)
i (pi
(N)) =
1
λ
log
(
Epi
(N)
[
eλ
∑
T
t=0 β
tm(sNi (t),u
N
i (t),d
(N)
t )
])
,
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where β ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor, λ > 0 is the risk factor, and T is the finite
horizon of the problem. Here, Epi
(N)[ · ] denotes the expectation with respect to the
probability law, which is uniquely specified by the kernels in (2.1) and (2.2) and the
initial state distribution κ0.
Since 1
λ
log(·) is a strictly increasing function, without loss of generality, it suffices
to consider only the part with expectation:
W
(N)
i (pi
(N)) = Epi
(N)
[
eλ
∑
T
t=0 β
tm(sNi (t),u
N
i (t),d
(N)
t )
]
.
With this cost function, the equilibrium solution for the game is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. A policy pi(N∗) = (π1∗, . . . , πN∗) constitutes a Nash equilibrium
for the N -player game, if
W
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Πi
W
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , where pi
(N∗)
−i = (π
j∗)j 6=i.
As we have explained in detail in [42], establishing the existence of Nash equilibria
for partially-observed mean-field games is challenging due to the (almost) decentralized
and noisy nature of the information structure of the problem. To that end, we slightly
change the definition of Nash equilibrium in this model and adopt the approximate
Nash equilibrium concept instead of exact Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.2. A policy pi(N∗) ∈ Π˜(N) is a Nash equilibrium if
W
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Π˜i
W
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , and an ε-Nash equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) if
W
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) ≤ inf
pii∈Π˜i
W
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i) + ε
for each i = 1, . . . , N .
According to this definition, the agents can only use their local observations
(gNi (t), . . . , g
N
i (0)) to construct their policies. In real life applications, agents typ-
ically have access only to their local observations. Hence, it suffices to establish the
existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium for the game with a local information
structure. In addition, in the discrete-time mean field literature, it is common to
establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria with local (decentralized) in-
formation structures (see [1] [8]). This is true for continuous-time partially observed
case as well (see [42]).
Here, our goal is to establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for
games with sufficiently many agents. Indeed, if the number of agents is small, it is all
but impossible to show even the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for these
types of games. Therefore, it is key to assume that the number of agents is large (but
finite). With this assumption, we can go to the infinite population limit, for which
we can model the mean-field term as an exogenous state-measure flow, which should
be consistent with the distribution of a generic agent (i.e., the NCE principle) by
the law of large numbers. In this case, to establish the existence of an equilibrium,
a generic agent should solve a classical partially observed stochastic control problem
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
6 N. SALDI, T. BAS¸AR, AND M. RAGINSKY
with a constraint on the distributions on the states (i.e., mean-field game). Then, we
expect that if each agent in the finite-agent N game adopts the equilibrium policy
in the infinite-population limit, the resulting policy will be an approximate Nash
equilibrium for all sufficiently large N .
Note that, in the risk-sensitive case, the one-stage cost functions are in a mul-
tiplicative form as opposed to the risk-neutral case. As stated earlier, this makes
the analysis of the problem quite complicated. Therefore, we will first construct an
equivalent non-homogeneous game model, where the cost can be written in an additive
form as in the risk-neutral case. Then, by adapting the proof technique in [42] to the
non-homogeneous and finite-horizon set-up, we consider the corresponding mean-field
game for this equivalent model that arises in the infinite-population limit (N → ∞)
and prove the existence of an appropriately defined mean-field equilibrium for this
limiting mean-field game. Then we pass back to the finite-N case and show that, if
each agent in the original problem adopts the mean-field equilibrium policy, then the
resulting policy will be an approximate Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N .
The following assumptions will be imposed throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. (a) The cost function m is bounded and continuous with
‖m‖ = sups∈S |m(s)| ≤ K.
(b) The stochastic kernel q is weakly continuous in (s, u, κ); i.e.,
q( · |s(k), u(k), κk)→ q( · |s, u, κ) weakly when (s(k), u(k), κk)→ (s, u, κ).
(c) The observation kernel l is continuous in s with respect to total variation
norm; i.e., for all s, l( · |sk)→ l( · |s) in total variation norm when sk → s.
(d) A is compact.
(e) There exist a constant α ≥ 0 and a continuous moment function v : S →
[1,∞) (see [26, Definition E.7]) such that
sup
(u,κ)∈A×P(S)
∫
S
v(y)q(dy|s, u, κ) ≤ αv(s).(2.3)
(f) The initial probability measure κ0 satisfies
∫
S
v(s)κ0(ds) =M <∞.
2.2. Equivalent Game Model. In this section, we construct an equivalent
game model whose states are the states of the original model plus the one-stage costs
incurred up to that time. Namely, the state at time t for Agent i is
xNi (t) =
(
sNi (t),
t−1∑
k=0
βkm(sNi (k), u
N
i (k), d
(N)
k )
)
.
In this new model, finite-horizon risk-sensitive cost function can be written in an
additive-form like in risk-neutral case. For this new game model, we have been inspired
by [5], in which the authors study the classical fully-observed risk-sensitive control
problem. For a generic agent, this new game model is specified by
(
X,A,Y, {pt}T+1t=0 , r, {ct}T+1t=0 , µ0
)
,
where X = S× [0, L] is the new state space with L = K1−β , where L is the maximum
risk-neutral discounted-cost that can be incurred. For every t, the state transition
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
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kernel pt : X× A× P(X)→ P(X) is defined as1:
pt
(
B ×D∣∣x(t), a(t), µt) = q(B|s(t), a(t), µt,1)⊗ δm(t)+βtm(s(t),a(t),µt,1)(D),
where B ∈ B(S), D ∈ B([0, L]), x(t) = (s(t),m(t)), and µt,1 is the marginal of µt on
S. Here, pt is indeed the controlled transition probability of the next state s
N
i (t+ 1)
and current risk-neutral total discounted cost
∑t
k=0 β
km(sNi (k), a
N
i (k), d
(N)
k ) given
the current state-action pair (sNi (t), a
N
i (t)) and past risk-neutral total discounted
cost
∑t−1
k=0 β
km(sNi (k), a
N
i (k), d
(N)
k ) in the original game. The observation kernel r :
X → P(Y) is equivalent to the observation kernel l in the original problem; that
is, r(dy|x) = l(dy|s) where x = (s,m). For each t, the one-stage cost function
ct : X× A× P(X)→ [0,∞) is defined as:
ct(x(t), a(t), µt) =
{
0, if t ≤ T
eλm(t), if t = T + 1.
Finally, the initial measure µ0 is given by µ0(dx(0)) = κ0(ds(0)) ⊗ δ0(dm(0)), where
the initial states {xNi (0)} are independent and identically distributed according to µ0.
Note that, in this equivalent game model, the finite-horizon is T +1 instead of T and
system components depend on time t. We also define the empirical distribution of
the states at time t as follows:
e
(N)
t ( · ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxN
i
(t)( · ) ∈ P(X).
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, for each t, the following are true for the
new game model:
(I) The one-stage cost function ct is bounded and continuous.
(II) The stochastic kernel pt is weakly continuous.
(III) The observation kernel r is continuous with respect to the total variation
distance.
(IV) Let w : X→ [1,∞) be defined as w(x) = w((s,m)) = v(s), which is a moment
function. Then, we have
sup
(a,µ)∈A×P(X)
∫
X
w(y)pt(dy|x, a, µ) ≤ αw(x).(2.4)
(V) The initial probability measure µ0 satisfies
∫
X
w(x)µ0(dx) =M <∞.
Recall that Π˜i denotes the set of policies for Agent i that only use observations
in the original game. Note that Π˜i is also the set of policies for Agent i that only use
observations in the new game model. For Agent i, the finite-horizon risk-neutral total
cost under the N -tuple of policies pi(N) ∈ Π˜(N) is denoted as J (N)i (pi(N)); that is
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) = Epi
(N)
[T+1∑
t=0
ct(x
N
i (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
.
The following proposition makes the connection between this new model and the
original model. The proof is straightforward, and so, we omit the details.
1In the remainder of this paper, we use letter ‘a’ instead of ‘u’, to denote actions, to emphasize
that they are generated using the new game model.
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Proposition 2.3. For any pi(N) ∈ Π˜(N) and i = 1, . . . , N , we have J (N)i (pi(N)) =
W
(N)
i (pi
(N)).
Proposition 2.3 states that the new game model is equivalent to the original game
model in terms of cost functions. Hence, in the remainder of this paper, we replace
the original game model with the new one; that is, from this point on, we have the
following system components satisfying (I)-(V):
(
X,A,Y, {pt}T+1t=0 , r, {ct}T+1t=0 , µ0
)
.
Note that the cost functions J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) of this new game model are in additive form
(i.e., risk-neutral). Therefore, we can use a technique similar to the one in [42] to
prove the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium. To this end, we will first
consider the infinite-population limit of the new game model and prove the existence
of an equilibrium. Then, we will go back to the finite agent case and establish the
existence of approximate Nash equilibrium for the new game model using the infinite
population equilibrium solution. Since, by Proposition 2.3, the new game model has
the same cost function as the original game model, the last result also implies the
existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium for the original game, which was the
main goal of this paper.
3. Partially observed mean-field games and mean-field equilibria. In
this section, we introduce the infinite population limit of the new game introduced in
the preceding section.
Although it is called mean-field game, it is not game in the classical sense: it is a
stochastic control problem whose state distribution at each time step should satisfy
a certain consistency condition. The optimal solution of this problem is referred to
as mean-field equilibrium. In other words, we have a single agent and model the
mean-field term by an exogenous state-measure flow µ := (µt)
T+1
t=0 ⊂ P(X) with a
given initial condition µ0, by the law of large numbers. This measure flow µ should
also be consistent with the state distributions of this single agent when the agent acts
optimally. The precise mathematical description of the problem is given as follows.
The mean-field game model for a generic agent is specified by
(
X,A,Y, {pt}T+1t=0 , r, {ct}T+1t=0 , µ0
)
,
where, as before, X, A, and Y are the state, action, and observation spaces, respec-
tively. The stochastic kernel pt : X × A × P(X) → P(X) denotes the transition
probability, and r : X × P(X) → P(Y) denotes the observation kernel. The measur-
able function ct : X× A× P(X)→ [0,∞) is the one-stage cost function and µ0 is the
distribution of the initial state.
Recall the history spaces G0 = Y and Gt = (Y × A)t × Y for t = 1, 2, . . ., all
endowed with product Borel σ-algebras. A policy is a sequence π = {πt} of stochastic
kernels on A given Gt. The set of all policies is denoted by Π.
We let M = {µ ∈ P(X)T+2 : µ0 is fixed} be the set of all state-measure flows
with a given initial condition µ0. Given any measure flow µ ∈ M, the evolution of
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the states, observations, and actions is as follows
x(0) ∼ µ0,
y(t) ∼ r( · |x(t)), t = 0, 1, . . .
x(t) ∼ pt−1( · |x(t− 1), a(t− 1), µt−1), t = 1, 2, . . .
a(t) ∼ πt( · |γ(t)), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where γ(t) ∈ Gt is the observation-action history up to time t. An initial distribution
µ0 on X, a policy π, and a state-measure flow µ define a unique probability measure
P pi on (X × Y × A)T+2. The expectation with respect to P pi is denoted by Epi[ · ].
A policy π∗ ∈ Π is said to be optimal for µ if Jµ(π∗) = infpi∈Π Jµ(π), where the
finite-horizon cost of policy π with measure flow µ is given by
Jµ(π) = E
pi
[T+1∑
t=0
ct(x(t), a(t), µt)
]
Using these definitions, we first define the set-valued mapping Ψ : M → 2Π as
Ψ(µ) = {π ∈ Π : π is optimal for µ}. Conversely, we define a single-valued mapping
Λ : Π→M as follows: given π ∈ Π, the state-measure flow µ := Λ(π) is constructed
recursively as
µt+1( · ) =
∫
X×A
pt( · |x(t), a(t), µt)P pi(da(t)|x(t))µt(dx(t)),
where P pi(da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under π
and (µτ )0≤τ≤t. Using Ψ and Λ, we now introduce the mean-field equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. A pair (π∗,µ∗) ∈ Π ×M is a mean-field equilibrium if π∗ ∈
Ψ(µ∗) and µ∗ = Λ(π∗).
The main result of this section is the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. Later we
will show that this mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilib-
rium for games with sufficiently many agents.
Theorem 3.2. The mean-field game
(
X,A,Y, {pt}T+1t=0 , r, {ct}T+1t=0 , µ0
)
admits a
mean-field equilibrium (π∗,µ∗).
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is given in section 4. To establish the existence of an
equilibrium, we first reduce the problem to a fully observed one, and then use the
dynamic programming principle in addition to the Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
4. Proof of Theorem 3.2. Note that any measure flow µ ∈M leads to a non-
homogenous partially-observed Markov decision process (POMDP). Hence, before
starting the proof of Theorem 3.2, we first review a few relevant results on POMDPs.
To this end, fix any µ ∈ M and consider the corresponding optimal control problem.
Let Pw(X) =
{
µ ∈ P(X) : ∫
X
w(x)µ(dx) < ∞}. It is known that any POMDP
can be reduced to a (completely observable) MDP (see [48], [40]), whose states are
the posterior state distributions or beliefs of the observer; that is, the state at time t
is
z(t) = Pr{x(t) ∈ · |y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t− 1)} ∈ P(X).
We call this equivalent MDP the belief-state MDP. Note that since L(x(t)) ∈ Pw(X)
under any policy by (IV)-(V), we have Pr{x(t) ∈ · |y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t−1)} ∈
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Pw(X) almost everywhere. Therefore, the belief-state MDP has state space Z = Pw(X)
and action space A. Here, Z is endowed with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the
topology of weak convergence. Next, we construct the transition probabilities {ηt}T+1t=0
of the belief-state MDP (see also [25]). Let z denote the generic state variable for the
belief-state MDP. Fix any t. First consider the transition probability on X× Y given
Z× A
Rt(x ∈ A, y ∈ B|z, a) =
∫
X
κt(A,B|x′, a)z(dx′),
where κt(dx, dy|x′, a) = r(dy|x) ⊗ pt(dx|x′, a, µt). Let us disintegrate Rt as follows
Rt(dx, dy|z, a) = Ht(dy|z, a) ⊗ Ft(dx|z, a, y). Then, we define the mapping Ft : Z ×
A× Y→ Z as
Ft(z, a, y)( · ) = Ft( · |z, a, y).(4.1)
Then, ηt : Z× A→ P(Z) is defined as
ηt( · |z(t), a(t)) =
∫
Y
δFt(z(t),a(t),y(t+1))( · ) Ht(dy(t+ 1)|z(t), a(t)).
The initial point for the belief-state MDP is µ0; that is, L(z(0)) ∼ δµ0 . Finally, for
each t, the one-stage cost function Ct of the belief-state MDP is given by
Ct(z, a) =
∫
X
ct(x, a, µt)z(dx).(4.2)
Hence, the belief-state MDP is a Markov decision process with the components(
Z,A, {ηt}T+1t=0 , {Ct}T+1t=0 , δµ0
)
.
For the belief-state MDP define the history spaces K0 = Z and Kt = (Z ×
A)t × Z, t = 1, 2, . . .. A policy is a sequence ϕ = {ϕt} of stochastic kernels on
A given Kt. The set of all policies is denoted by Φ. A Markov policy is a se-
quence ϕ = {ϕt} of stochastic kernels on A given Z. The set of Markov policies
is denoted by M. Let J˜(ϕ, µ0) denote the finite-horizon cost function of policy
ϕ ∈ Φ for initial point µ0 of the belief-state MDP. Notice that any history vector
s(t) = (z(0), . . . , z(t), a(0), . . . , a(t − 1)) of the belief-state MDP is a function of the
history vector γ(t) = (y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t − 1)) of the POMDP. Let us write
this relation as i(γ(t)) = s(t). Hence, for a policy ϕ = {ϕt} ∈ Φ, we can define a
policy πϕ = {πϕt } ∈ Π as πϕt ( · |γ(t)) = ϕt( · |i(γ(t))). Let us write this as a mapping
from Φ to Π: Φ ∋ ϕ 7→ i(ϕ) = πϕ ∈ Π. It is straightforward to show that the cost
functions J˜(ϕ, µ0) and Jµ(π
ϕ) are the same. One can also prove that (see [48], [40])
inf
ϕ∈Φ
J˜(ϕ, µ0) = inf
pi∈Π
Jµ(π)(4.3)
and furthermore, that if ϕ is an optimal policy for belief-state MDP, then πϕ is optimal
for the POMDP as well. Therefore, the optimal control problem for the mean-field
game is equivalent to the optimal control of belief-state MDP.
We now derive the conditions that are satisfied by belief-state MDP. To that end,
define W : Z→ R as
W (z) =
∫
X
w(x)z(dx).
Note that W is a lower semi-continuous moment function on Z. One can prove that
(see [42, Section 4]) the belief-state MDP satisfies the following conditions under
Assumption 1:
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(i) The cost functions {Ct} are bounded and continuous.
(ii) The stochastic kernels {ηt} are weakly continuous.
(iii) A is compact and Z is σ-compact.
(iv) There exists a constant α ≥ 0 such that
sup
a∈A
∫
Z
W (y)ηt(dy|z, a) ≤ αW (z), for all t.
(v) The initial probability measure δµ0 satisfies W (δµ0) =M <∞.
With these conditions, we are now ready to prove Theorem 3.2 by adapting tech-
niques in [42] to the non-homogeneous and finite-horizon set-up.
We first define the mapping B : P(Z) → P(X), which will define the relation
between state-measure flows in the mean-field game and state-measure flows in the
belief-state MDP, as follows:
B(ν)( · ) =
∫
Z
z( · ) ν(dz).
Using this definition, for any ν ∈ P(Z × A)T+2, we define the measure flow µν ∈
P(X)T+2 as follows:
µν =
(
B(νt,1)
)T+1
t=0
,
where for any ν ∈ P(Z×A), we let ν1 denote the marginal of ν on Z. Let {ηνt }T+1t=0 and
{Cνt }T+1t=0 be, respectively, the transition probabilities and one-stage cost functions of
belief-state MDP induced by the measure flow µν . We let Jν∗,t : Z → [0,∞) denote
the optimal value function at time t of this belief-state MDP; that is,
Jν∗,t(z) = inf
ϕ∈Φ
Eϕ
[T+1∑
k=t
Cνk (z(k), a(k))
∣∣∣∣z(t) = z
]
.
Let Jν∗ =
(
Jν∗,t
)T+1
t=0
.
To prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, we use the technique in [33].
To that end, we first transform the fixed point equation π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) characterizing
the mean-field equilibrium into a fixed-point equation of a set-valued mapping from
the set of state-action measure flows P(Z×A)T+2 into itself. Then, using Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem ([2, Corollary 17.55]), we deduce the existence of a mean-field
equilibrium.
For any t, the Bellman optimality operator T νt : Cb(Z)→ Cb(Z) is given by
T νt u(z) = min
a∈A
[
Cνt (z, a) +
∫
Z
u(y)ηνt (dy|z, a)
]
.
Note that T νt J
ν
∗,t+1 = J
ν
∗,t for every t. The following theorem is a known result in
the theory of nonhomogeneous Markov decision processes (see [27, Theorems 14.4 and
17.1]). For any given ν, it characterizes the optimal policy of the belief-state MDP.
Theorem 4.1. For any ν, a policy ϕ ∈ M is optimal if and only if, for all t,
ν
ϕ
t
({
(z, a) : Cνt (z, a) +
∫
Z
Jν∗,t+1(y)η
ν
t (dy|z, a) = T νt Jν∗,t+1(z)
})
= 1,(4.4)
where νϕt = L
(
z(t), a(t)
)
under ϕ and ν.
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Using Theorem 4.1, we now define the set-valued map from P(Z × A)T+2 into
itself. To that end, for any ν ∈ P(Z× A)T+2, let us define the following sets:
C(ν) =
{
ν ′ ∈ P(Z× A)T+2 : ν′0,1 = δµ0 and ν′t+1,1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a)νt(dz, da)
}
and
B(ν) =
{
ν ′ ∈ P(Z× A)T+2 : ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T + 1,
ν′t
({
(z, a) : Cνt (z, a) +
∫
Z
Jν∗,t+1(y)η
ν
t (dy|z, a) = T νt Jν∗,t+1(z)
})
= 1
}
.
Here, the set C(ν) characterizes the consistency of the mean-field term with the state
distribution of a generic agent, and the set B(ν) characterizes optimality of the policy
for the mean-field term. The set-valued mapping Γ : P(Z × A)T+2 → 2P(Z×A)T+2 is
given as follows:
Γ(ν) = C(ν) ∩B(ν).
Note that the fixed-point equation π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) characterizes the behaviour of the
state distribution and the control law in mean-field equilibrium separately. However,
by combining the state distribution with the control law, which gives the joint dis-
tribution of the state and the action, we can characterize via the set-valued mapping
Γ the behaviour of the state and the control law together in mean-field equilibrium.
This will enable us to deduce the existence of a mean-field equilibrium without intro-
ducing a topology for the control laws, which is in general the solution technique in
continuous time setup.
An element ν is a fixed point of Γ if ν ∈ Γ(ν). The following proposition makes
the connection between mean-field equilibria and fixed points of Γ.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that Γ has a fixed point ν = (νt)
T+1
t=0 . Construct a
Markov policy ϕ = {ϕt} for belief-state MDP by disintegrating each νt as νt(dz, da) =
νt,1(dz)ϕt(da|z). Let π∗ = πϕ and µ∗ = (B(νt,1))T+1t=0 . Then the pair (π∗,µ∗) is a
mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. Note that, since ν ∈ C(ν), we have νt = L
(
z(t), a(t)
)
for belief-state MDP
under the policy ϕ and the measure flow µ∗. Then, for any f ∈ Cb(X), we have
µ∗t+1(f) = B(νt+1,1)(f)
=
∫
Z×A
∫
Z
z′(f)ηνt (dz
′|z, a)νt(dz, da)
=
∫
Z×A
{∫
X
∫
X
f(y)pt(dy|x, a, µ∗t )z(dx)
}
νt(dz, da)
= Eϕ
[
lt(z(t), a(t))
](
here lt(z, a) =
∫
X
∫
X
f(y)pt(dy|x, a, µ∗t )z(dx)
)
= Epi
∗
[∫
X
f(y)pt(dy|x(t), a(t), µ∗t )
]
.(4.5)
Since (4.5) is true for all f ∈ Cb(X), we have
µ∗t+1( · ) =
∫
X×A
pt( · |x(t), a(t), µ∗t )P pi
∗
(da(t)|x(t))µ∗t (dx(t)),
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where P pi
∗
(da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under π∗
and (µ∗τ )0≤τ≤t. Hence, Λ(π
∗) = µ∗.
Since ν ∈ B(ν), the corresponding Markov policy ϕ satisfies (4.4) for ν. There-
fore, by Theorem 4.1 and the fact that νt = L
(
z(t), a(t)
)
for belief-state MDP under
the policy ϕ and the measure flow µ∗, ϕ is optimal for belief-state MDP induced by
the measure flow µ∗ (or, equivalently, ν). Therefore, π∗ ∈ Ψ(µ∗).
By Proposition 4.2, it suffices to prove that Γ has a fixed point in order to establish
the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. To prove this, we use Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem, which is stated below:
Theorem 4.3. [2, Corollary 17.55] Let K be a non-empty compact convex subset
of a locally convex Hausdorff space, and let the set-valued mapping φ : K → 2K
have closed graph and non-empty convex values. Then, the set of fixed points of φ is
compact and non-empty.
Hence, in order to use Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, the set-valued mapping Γ
should be defined on a convex and compact set. However, the set P(Z×A)T+2 in the
definition of Γ is not compact. To get around that, we will prove that the image of
P(Z × A)T+2 under Γ is in fact a subset of some convex and compact set, and it is
sufficient to consider this convex and compact set in the definition of Γ. To that end,
for each t, define the set
Pt(Z) =
{
µ ∈ P(Z) :
∫
Z
W (z)µ(dz) ≤ αtM
}
.
Since W is a lower semi-continuous moment function, the set Pt(Z) is compact with
respect to the weak topology [26, Proposition E.8, p. 187]. Let us define
Pt(Z× A) = {ν ∈ P(Z× A) : ν1 ∈ Pt(Z)}.
Since A is compact, Pt(Z×A) is tight. Furthermore, Pt(Z×A) is closed with respect
to the weak topology since W is lower semi-continuous. Hence, Pt(Z×A) is compact.
Let Ξ =
∏T+1
t=0 Pt(Z × A), which is convex and compact with respect to the product
topology.
Proposition 4.4. We have Γ
(P(Z × A)T+2) = {ν′ : ν ′ ∈ Γ(ν), ν ∈ P(Z ×
A)T+2
} ⊂ Ξ.
Proof. Fix any ν ∈ P(Z × A)T+2. It is sufficient to prove that C(ν) ⊂ Ξ as
Γ(ν) = C(ν) ∩B(ν). Let ν ′ ∈ C(ν). We prove by induction that ν′t,1 ∈ Ptv(Z) for all
t. The claim trivially holds for t = 0 as ν′0,1 = δµ0 . Assume that the claim holds for t
and consider t+ 1. We have∫
Z
W (y)ν′t+1,1(dy) =
∫
Z×A
∫
Z
W (y)ηνt (dy|z, a)νt(dz, da)
≤
∫
Z
αW (z)νt,1(dz) (by (iv))
≤ αt+1M (as νt,1 ∈ Ptv(Z)).
Hence, ν′t+1,1 ∈ Pt+1v (Z).
By Proposition 4.4, we can now consider Γ as a multi-valued mapping from Ξ
into itself. It can be proved that C(ν) ∩ B(ν) 6= ∅ for any ν ∈ Ξ. Indeed, for any
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t ≥ 0, we define
µt+1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a) νt(dx, da).
Moreover, for any t ≥ 0, let ft : Z → A be the minimizer of the following optimality
equation:
Cνt (z, ft(z)) +
∫
Z
Jν∗,t+1(y)η
ν
t (dy|z, ft(z)) = T νt Jν∗,t+1(z).
Existence of such an ft follows from the Measurable Selection Theorem [26, Section
D]. If we define ν′t(dz, da) = µt(dz) δft(z)(da), then it is straightforward to prove that
ν ′ ∈ C(ν) ∩ B(ν), and thus C(ν) ∩ B(ν) 6= ∅. Moreover, both C(ν) and B(ν) are
convex, and so, their intersection is also convex. Ξ is a convex compact subset of a
locally convex topological space M(Z × A)T+2, where M(Z × A) denotes the set of
all finite signed measures on Z×A. Hence, in order to deduce the existence of a fixed
point of Γ, we only need to prove that it has a closed graph. Before stating this result,
we state the following proposition which is a key element of the proof.
Proposition 4.5. ([42, Proposition 4.3]) Let ν(n) → ν in product topology.
Then, for all t, ην
(n)
t ( · |zn, an) weakly converges to ηνt ( · |z, a) for all (zn, an) →
(z, a) ∈ Z× A.
Using Proposition 4.5, we can now prove the following result.
Proposition 4.6. The graph of Γ, i.e., the set
Gr(Γ) := {(ν, ξ) ∈ Ξ× Ξ : ξ ∈ Γ(ν)} ,
is closed.
Proof. The graph Gr(Γ) of Γ is closed if and only if when (ν(n), ξ(n)) → (ν, ξ)
as n → ∞ for some {(ν(n), ξ(n))} ⊂ Ξ, then we must have ξ ∈ Γ(ν). To that end,
let
{
(ν(n), ξ(n))
} ⊂ Gr(Γ) be such that (ν(n), ξ(n)) → (ν, ξ) as n → ∞ for some
(ν, ξ) ∈ Ξ× Ξ. We prove that ξ ∈ Γ(ν).
Using Proposition 4.5, we first prove that ξ ∈ C(ν); that is, for all t, we have
ξt+1,1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a)νt(dz, da).
For all n and t, we have
ξ
(n)
t+1,1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ην
(n)
t ( · |z, a)ν(n)t (dz, da).(4.6)
Since ξ(n) → ξ in Ξ, ξ(n+1)t+1 → ξt+1 weakly. Let g ∈ Cb(Z). Then, by [34, Theorem
3.5], we have
lim
n→∞
∫
Z×A
∫
Z
g(z′)ην
(n)
t (dz
′|z, a)ν(n)t (dz, da) =
∫
Z×A
∫
Z
g(z′)ηνt (dz
′|z, a)νt(dx, da)
since ν
(n)
t → νt weakly and
∫
Z
g(y)ην
(n)
t ( · |z, a) converges to
∫
Z
g(y)ηνt ( · |z, a) contin-
uously2 (see [34, Theorem 3.5]). This implies that the measure on the right hand side
2Suppose g, gn (n ≥ 1) are measurable functions on metric space E. The sequence gn is said to
converge to g continuously if limn→∞ gn(en) = g(e) for any en → e where e ∈ E.
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of (4.6) converges weakly to
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a)νt(dz, da). Therefore, we have
ξt+1,1( · ) =
∫
Z×A
ηνt ( · |z, a)νt(dz, da),
from which we conclude that ξ ∈ C(ν).
To complete the proof, it suffices to prove that ξ ∈ B(ν). To that end, for each
n and t, let us define the following functions
F
(n)
t (z, a) = C
ν
(n)
t (z, a) +
∫
Z
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y)η
ν
(n)
t (dy|z, a)
and
Ft(z, a) = C
ν
t (z, a) +
∫
Z
Jν∗,t+1(y)η
ν
t (dy|z, a).
By definition, Jν
(n)
∗,t (z) = mina∈A F
(n)
t (z, a) and J
ν
∗,t(z) = mina∈A Ft(z, a). Define
also the following sets
A
(n)
t =
{
(z, a) : F
(n)
t (z, a) = J
ν
(n)
∗,t (z)
}
and At =
{
(z, a) : Ft(z, a) = J
ν
∗,t(z)
}
.
Since ξ(n) ∈ B(ν(n)), we have 1 = ξ(n)t
(
A
(n)
t
)
, for all n and t. To prove to ξ ∈ B(ν),
we need to show that 1 = ξt
(
At
)
, for all t.
First note that since both F
(n)
t and J
ν
(n)
∗,t are continuous, A
(n)
t is closed. Moreover,
At is also closed as both Ft and J
ν
∗,t are continuous. Using Proposition 4.5, one can
also prove as in [41, Proposition 3.10], [43, Proposition 4.4] that F
(n)
t converges to Ft
continuously and Jν
(n)
∗,t converges to J
ν
∗,t continuously, as n→∞.
For each M ≥ 1, define the closed set BMt =
{
(z, a) : Ft(z, a) ≥ Jν∗,t(z) + ǫ(M)
}
,
where the sequence {ǫ(M)} is decreasing and ǫ(M) → 0 as M → ∞. Since both Ft
and Jν∗,t are continuous, we can choose {ǫ(M)}M≥1 so that ξt(∂BMt ) = 0 for each M .
Note that by the monotone convergence theorem, we have
ξ
(n)
t
(
Act ∩ A(n)t
)
= lim inf
M→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A(n)t ).
This implies that
1 = lim sup
n→∞
lim inf
M→∞
{
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩A(n)t
)
+ ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A(n)t
)}
≤ lim inf
M→∞
lim sup
n→∞
{
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩A(n)t
)
+ ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A(n)t
)}
.
For any fixed M , we prove that the limit of the second term in the last expression
converges to zero. To that end, we first note that ξ
(n)
t converges weakly to ξt as
n→∞ when both measures are restricted to BMt , as BMt is closed and ξt(∂BMt ) = 0
[9, Theorem 8.2.3]. Furthermore, since F
(n)
t converges to Ft continuously and J
ν
(n)
∗,t
converges to Jν∗,t continuously, 1A(n)t ∩BMt
converges continuously to 0, which implies
by [34, Theorem 3.5] that
lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩A(n)t
)
= 0.
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Therefore, we obtain
1 ≤ lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩ A(n)t
) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t (At) ≤ ξt(At),
where the last inequality follows from the Portmanteau theorem [7, Theorem 2.1] and
the fact that At is closed. Hence, ξt(At) = 1. Since t is arbitrary, this is true for all
t. This means that ξ ∈ B(ν). Therefore, ξ ∈ Γ(ν).
As a result of Proposition 4.6, we now conclude via Kakutani’s fixed point the-
orem ([2, Corollary 17.55]) that Γ has a fixed point. Therefore, the pair (π∗,µ∗) in
Proposition 4.2 is a mean field equilibrium. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
5. Approximation of Nash Equilibria. We are now ready to prove that the
policy in the mean-field equilibrium, when applied by every agent, is approximately
Nash equilibrium for mean-field games with a sufficiently large number of agents. Let
(π
′∗,µ∗) denote the pair in the mean-field equilibrium. In order to prove the existence
of an approximate Nash equilibrium, we need Assumption 2 below in addition to
Assumption 1.
Our approach can be summarized as follows: (i) First, Assumption 2 enables us
to define another mean-field equilibrium, in which the policy deterministically and
continuously depends on only the observations; (ii) we then construct an equivalent
game model whose states are the states of the game model in subsection 2.2 plus the
current and past observations; (iii) in this equivalent model, the new mean-field equi-
librium policy becomes Markov; (iv) using this Markov structure, we prove that the
cost function of a generic agent under any policy in the finite-agent regime, where the
rest of the agents adopt mean-field equilibrium policy, converges to the cost function
in the infinite-population limit as the number of agents goes to infinity; (v) since the
mean-field equilibrium policy is optimal in the infinite-population limit, we establish
the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium via the result in step (iv).
Let dBL denote the bounded Lipschitz metric on P(S), which metrizes the weak
topology [21, Proposition 11.3.2].
Assumption 2. (a) ωq(r)→ 0 and ωm(r)→ 0 as r → 0, where
ωq(r) = sup
(s,u)∈S×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
‖q( · |s, u, µ)− q( · |s, u, ν)‖TV
ωm(r) = sup
(s,u)∈S×A
sup
µ,ν:
dBL(µ,ν)≤r
|m(s, u, µ)−m(s, u, ν)|.
(b) For each t ≥ 0, π′∗t : Gt → P(A) is deterministic; that is, π
′∗
t ( · |g(t)) =
δft(g(t))( · ) for some measurable function ft : Gt → A, and weakly continuous.
In Appendix 8.1, we give sufficient conditions for Assumption 2-(b) in terms of
the system components.
We now construct another mean-field equilibrium in which the policy determin-
istically depends on only the observations. For t, let Yt+1 =
∏t
k=0 Y. Then, for each
t ≥ 1, define f˜t : Yt+1 → A as
f˜t(y(t), . . . , y(0)) = ft
(
y(t), . . . , y(0), f˜t−1(y(t− 1), . . . , y(0)), . . . , f˜0(y(0))
)
,
where f˜0 = f0. Let π
∗
t ( · |y(t), . . . , y(0)) = δf˜t(y(t),...,y(0))( · ). Note that π∗t is a weakly
continuous stochastic kernel on A given Yt+1 under Assumption 2-(b). Moreover, π∗
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and π
′∗ are equivalent because, for all t, we have
P pi
′
∗(
a(t) ∈ · |g(t)) = P pi′∗(a(t) ∈ · |y(t), . . . , y(0))
= P pi
∗(
a(t) ∈ · |y(t), . . . , y(0)).
Hence, (π∗,µ∗) is also a mean-field equilibrium. In the sequel, we use (π∗,µ∗) to
prove the approximation result. The reason for passing from ft to f˜t is that the
latter policy becomes Markov in the equivalent game model that will be introduced
in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Then, we can prove the existence of an approximate
Nash equilibrium by adapting the proof techniques and results in [41, 43] to the game
models with expanding state spaces and non-homogeneous system components.
The following theorem is the main result of this section, which states that the
policy pi(N,∗) = (π∗, . . . , π∗), where π∗ is repeated N times, is an ε-Nash equilibrium
for sufficiently large N . Its proof appears in the next section.
Theorem 5.1. For any ε > 0, there exists N(ε) such that for N ≥ N(ε), the
policy pi(N,∗) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents that is introduced
in subsection 2.2. Since the original N -agent game model is equivalent to the one in
subsection 2.2 by Proposition 2.3, the policy pi(N,∗) is also an ε-Nash equilibrium for
the original game with N agents.
6. Proof of Theorem 5.1. For the game model introduced in subsection 2.2,
the policy π∗ in the mean-field equilibrium is not necessarily Markov, and so, the
joint process of the state, observation, and mean-field term does not have the Markov
property as well. To prove Theorem 5.1, we will first introduce another equivalent
game model whose states are the state of the original game model3 plus the current and
past observations. In this new model, the mean-field equilibrium policy automatically
becomes Markov.
In the infinite-population limit, this new mean-field game model is specified by(
{Bt}T+1t=0 ,A, {Pt}T+1t=0 , {Ct}T+1t=0 , λ0
)
,
where, for each t, Bt = X× Y × . . .× Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+ 1-times
and A are the Polish state and action spaces
at time t, respectively. The stochastic kernel Pt : Bt×A×P(Bt)→ P(Bt+1) is defined
as:
Pt
(
Bt+1 ×Dt+1 × . . .×D0
∣∣b(t), a(t),∆t)
=
∫
Bt+1
r(Dt+1|x(t+ 1))
t∏
k=0
1Dk(y(k))pt(dx(t + 1)|x(t), a(t),∆t,1),
where Bt+1 ∈ B(X), Dk ∈ B(Y) (k = 0, . . . , t+1), b(t) = (x(t), y(t), y(t−1), . . . , y(0)),
and ∆t,1 is the marginal of ∆t on X. Indeed, Pt is the controlled transition proba-
bility of next state-observation pair, current observation, and past observations, i.e.,(
x(t + 1), y(t + 1), y(t), . . . , y(0)
)
, given the current state-observation pair and past
observations, i.e.,
(
x(t), y(t), y(t − 1), . . . , y(0)), in the original mean-field game. For
each t, the one-stage cost function Ct : Bt × A× P(Bt)→ [0,∞) is defined as:
Ct(b(t), a(t),∆t) = ct(x(t), a(t),∆t,1).
3When we say original game model in this section, it means the game model introduced in
subsection 2.2 in place of the risk-sensitive game model.
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Finally, the initial measure λ0 is given by λ0(db) = r(dy|x)µ0(dx), where b = (x, y).
Suppose that Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. Then, for each t, the following
are satisfied:
(I) The one-stage cost function Ct is bounded and continuous.
(II) The stochastic kernel Pt is weakly continuous.
It is straightforward to prove that (I) and (II) hold since ct is continuous, pt is weakly
continuous, and r is continuous in total variation norm. Recall the set of policies Π˜
in the original mean-field game which only use the observations; that is, π ∈ Π˜ if
πt : Y
t+1 → P(A) for each t ≥ 0. Note that Π˜ is a subset of the set of Markov policies
in the new model. For any measure flow ∆ = (∆t)t≥0, where ∆t ∈ P(Bt), we denote
by Jˆ∆(π) the finite-horizon risk-neutral total cost of the policy π ∈ Π˜ in this new
mean-field game model.
We also define the corresponding N agent game as follows. We have the Polish
state spaces {Bt}T+1t=0 and action space A. For every t and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, let
bNi (t) ∈ Bt and aNi (t) ∈ A denote the state and the action of Agent i at time t, and
let
∆
(N)
t ( · ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δbN
i
(t)( · ) ∈ P(Bt)
denote the empirical distribution of the state configuration at time t. The initial states
bNi (0) are independent and identically distributed according to λ0, and, for each t,
the next-state configuration (bN1 (t + 1), . . . , b
N
N (t + 1)) is generated according to the
probability laws
N∏
i=1
Pt
(
dbNi (t+ 1)
∣∣bNi (t), aNi (t),∆(N)t ).
Recall that Π˜i denotes the set of policies that only use local observations for Agent
i in the original game. Note that policies in Π˜i are Markov for the new model since
they partly use the state information. We let Π˜ci denote the set of all policies in
Π˜i for Agent i that are weakly continuous; that is, π = {πt} ∈ Π˜ci if for all t ≥ 0,
πt : Y
t+1 → P(A) is continuous when P(A) is endowed with the weak topology. For
Agent i, the finite-horizon risk-neutral total cost under the initial distribution λ0 and
N -tuple of policies pi(N) ∈ Π˜(N) is denoted by Jˆ (N)i (pi(N)).
The following proposition makes the connection between this new model and the
original model.
Proposition 6.1. For any N ≥ 1, pi(N) ∈ Π˜(N), and i = 1, . . . , N , we have
Jˆi(pi
(N)) = Ji(pi
(N)). Similarly, for any π ∈ Π˜ and measure flow∆, we have Jˆ∆(π) =
Jµ(π) where µ = (∆t,1)t≥0.
Proof. The result can easily be proved as in [42, Proposition 5.1], and thus we do
not include the details.
By Proposition 6.1, in the remainder of this section we consider the new game
model in place of the one introduced in subsection 2.2.
Define the measure flow ∆ = (∆t)t≥0 as follows:
∆t = L(x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)),
where L(x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)) denotes the probability law of (x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)) in the
original mean-field game under the policy π∗ in the mean-field equilibrium. For each
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t ≥ 0, define the stochastic kernel P pi∗t ( · |b,∆) on Bt+1 given Bt × P(Bt) as
P pi
∗
t ( · |b,∆) =
∫
A
Pt( · |b, a,∆)π∗t (da|b).
Since π∗t is weakly continuous, P
pi∗
t ( · |b,∆) is also weakly continuous in (b,∆). In the
sequel, to ease the notation, we will also write P pi
∗
t ( · |b,∆) as P pi
∗
t,∆( · |b).
Lemma 6.2. Measure flow ∆ satisfies
∆t+1( · ) =
∫
Bt
P pi
∗
t ( · |b,∆t)∆t(db)
= ∆tP
pi∗
t,∆t( · ).
Proof. The result can easily be proved as in [42, Lemma 5.1], and thus we do not
include the details.
For each N ≥ 1, let {bNi (t)}1≤i≤N denote the states of agents at time t in the
N -agent new game model under the policy pi(N,∗) = {π∗, π∗, . . . , π∗}. Define the
empirical distribution
∆
(N)
t ( · ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δbN
i
(t)( · ).
Proposition 6.3. For all t ≥ 0, we have L(∆(N)t ) → δ∆t weakly in P(P(Bt)),
as N →∞.
Proof. Weak topology on P(Bt) can be metrized using the following metric:
ρ(µ, ν) =
∞∑
m=1
2−(m+1)|µ(fm)− ν(fm)|,
where {fm}m≥1 is a sequence of real continuous and bounded functions on Bt such
that ‖fm‖ ≤ 1 for all m ≥ 1 (see [39, Theorem 6.6, p. 47]). Define the Wasserstein
distance of order 1 on the set of probability measures P(P(Bt)) as follows (see [47,
Definition 6.1]):
W1(Φ,Ψ) = inf
{
E[ρ(X,Y )] : L(X) = Φ and L(Y ) = Ψ}.
Note that since δ∆t is a Dirac measure, we have
W1(L(∆(N)t ), δ∆t) =
{
E[ρ(X,Y )] : L(X) = L(∆(N)t ) and L(Y ) = δ∆t
}
= E
[ ∞∑
m=1
2−(m+1)|∆(N)t (fm)−∆t(fm)|
]
.
Since convergence in W1 distance implies weak convergence (see [47, Theorem 6.9]),
it suffices to prove that
lim
N→∞
E
[|∆(N)t (f)−∆t(f)|] = 0
for any f ∈ Cb(Bt) and for all t. We prove this by induction on t.
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As {bNi (0)}1≤i≤N are i.i.d. with common distribution ∆0, the claim is true for
t = 0. We suppose that the claim holds for t and consider t+1. Fix any g ∈ Cb(Bt+1).
Then, we have
|∆(N)t+1(g)−∆t+1(g)| ≤ |∆(N)t+1(g)−∆(N)t P pi
∗
t,∆
(N)
t
(g)|+ |∆(N)t P pi
∗
t,∆
(N)
t
(g)−∆tP pi∗t,∆t(g)|.
(6.1)
We first prove that the expectation of the second term on the right-hand side (RHS)
of (6.1) converges to 0 as N →∞. To that end, define F : P(Bt)→ R as
F (∆) = ∆P pi
∗
t,∆(g) =
∫
Bt
∫
Bt+1
g(b′)P pi
∗
t (db
′|b,∆)∆(db).
One can prove that F ∈ Cb(P(Bt)). Indeed, suppose that ∆n converges to ∆.
Let us define
ln(b) =
∫
Bt+1
g(b′)P pi
∗
t (db
′|b,∆n) and l(b) =
∫
Bt+1
g(b′)P pi
∗
t (db
′|b,∆).
Since P pi
∗
t is weakly continuous, one can prove that ln converges to l continuously.
By [34, Theorem 3.5], we have F (∆n)→ F (∆), and so, F ∈ Cb(P(Bt)). This implies
that the expectation of the second term on the RHS of (6.1) converges to zero as
L(∆(N)t )→ δ∆t weakly, by the induction hypothesis.
Now, let us write the expectation of the first term on the RHS of (6.1) as
E
[
E
[
|∆(N)t+1(g)−∆(N)t P pi
∗
t,∆
(N)
t
(g)|
∣∣∣∣bN1 (t), . . . , bNN(t)
]]
.
Then, by [10, Lemma A.2], we have
E
[
|∆(N)t+1(g)−∆(N)t P pi
∗
t,∆
(N)
t
(g)|
∣∣∣∣bN1 (t), . . . , bNN (t)
]
≤ 2 ‖g‖√
N
.
Therefore, the expectation of the first term on the RHS of (6.1) also converges to zero
as N →∞. Since g was arbitrary, this completes the proof.
The implication of Proposition 6.3 is the key to prove the main theorem. It
basically says that, in the infinite-population limit, the empirical distribution of the
states under the mean-field policy converges to the deterministic measure flow∆ (i.e.,
the principle of law of large numbers). This result leads to the following important
proposition.
Proposition 6.4. We have
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (pi
(N,∗)) = Jˆ∆(π
∗) = inf
pi′∈Π
Jˆ∆(π
′).
Proof. As the transition probabilities Pt( · |d, a,∆) are continuous in ∆, the dy-
namics of the state of a generic agent in the finite-agent game with sufficiently
many agents and the dynamics of the state in the mean-field game under policies
pi(N,∗) = (π∗, . . . , π∗) and π∗, respectively, should therefore be close. Hence, the dis-
tributions of the states in these games should also be close, from which we obtain the
proposition. The precise mathematical proof is given below.
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For each t ≥ 0, let us define
Cpi∗t (b,∆) =
∫
A
Ct(b, a,∆)π
∗
t (da|b).
Note that random elements
(
bN1 (t), . . . , b
N
N (t),∆
(N)
t
)
are exchangeable; that is, for any
permutation σ of {1, . . . , N}, we have
L(bN1 (t), . . . , bNN(t),∆(N)t ) = L(bNσ(1)(t), . . . , bNσ(N)(t),∆(N)t ).
Hence, the cost function at time t can be written as
E
[
Ct(b
N
1 (t), a
N
1 (t),∆
(N)
t )
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
Ct(b
N
i (t), a
N
i (t),∆
(N)
t )
]
= E
[
∆
(N)
t
(
Cpi∗t (b,∆
(N)
t )
)]
.
Define F : P(Bt)→ R as
F (∆) =
∫
Bt
Cpi∗t (b,∆)∆(db).
One can show that F ∈ Cb(P(Bt)) as π∗t is weakly continuous. Hence, by Proposi-
tion 6.3, we obtain
lim
N→∞
E
[
Ct(b
N
1 (t), a
N
1 (t),∆
(N)
t )
]
= lim
N→∞
E
[
∆
(N)
t
(
Cpi∗t (b,∆
(N)
t )
)]
= lim
N→∞
E[F (∆
(N)
t )]
= F (∆t)
= ∆t(Cpi∗t ( · ,∆t)).(6.2)
Note that by Lemma 6.2, the cost in the mean-field game can be written as
Jˆ∆(π
∗) =
T+1∑
t=0
∆t(Cpi∗t ( · ,∆t)).
Therefore, by (6.2) and the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (pi
(N,∗)) = Jˆ∆(π
∗),
which completes the proof.
To obtain the approximation result, we should show that if the policy of some
agent deviates from the mean-field equilibrium policy, then the corresponding cost of
this agent should be close to the cost in the mean-field limit as in Proposition 6.4, for
N sufficiently large. Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions
are identical for all agents in the game model, it is sufficient to change the policy of
Agent 1 for each N . To that end, let {π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ Π˜c1 be an arbitrary sequence
of policies for Agent 1; that is, for each N ≥ 1 and t ≥ 0, π˜(N)t : Yt+1 → P(A) is
weakly continuous. For each N ≥ 1, let {b˜Ni (t)}1≤i≤N be the collection of states in
the N -person game under the policy p˜i(N) = {π˜(N), π∗, . . . , π∗}. Define
∆˜
(N)
t ( · ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ
b˜
(N)
i
(t)
( · ).
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The following result says that the asymptotic behaviour of the empirical distribution
of the states at each time t is insensitive to local deviations from the mean-field
equilibrium policy.
Proposition 6.5. For all t ≥ 0, we have L(∆˜(N)t ) → δ∆t weakly P(P(Bt)), as
N →∞.
Proof. The proof can be done by slightly modifying the proof of Proposition 6.3,
and therefore will not be included here.
For each N ≥ 1, let {bˆN(t)}t≥0 denote the state trajectory of the generic agent in
the mean-field game (i.e., infinite-population limit) under policy π˜(N); that is, bˆN(t)
evolves as follows:
bˆN(0) ∼ λ0 and bˆN(t+ 1) ∼ P p˜i(N)t,∆t ( · |bˆN(t)).
The cost function of this mean-field game is given by
Jˆ∆(π˜
(N)) =
T+1∑
t=0
E
[
Ct(bˆ
N (t), aˆN (t),∆t)
]
,(6.3)
where the actions at each time t ≥ 0 is generated according to the probability law
π˜
(N)
t (daˆ
N (t)|bˆN (t)) = π˜(N)t (daˆN (t)|yˆN (t), . . . , yˆN(0)).
The following result is a bit technical but very important for proving the main
result. Its proof is quite long and complicated, and thus can be found in Appendix 8.2.
Proposition 6.6. For any t ≥ 0, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(b˜N1 (t))(gN )− L(bˆN (t))(gN )∣∣ = 0
for any sequence {gN} ⊂ Cb(Bt) such that supN≥1 ‖gN‖ < ∞ and ωg(r) → 0 as
r → 0, where
ωg(r) = sup
s∈S
yt∈Yt
sup
N≥1
sup
m,m′
|m−m′|≤r
|gN (s,m, yt)− gN(s,m′, yt)|.
Using Proposition 6.6, we now prove the following result.
Theorem 6.7. Let {π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ Π˜c1 be an arbitrary sequence of policies for
Agent 1. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣Jˆ (N)1 (π˜(N), π∗, . . . , π∗)− Jˆ∆(π˜(N))∣∣ = 0,
where Jˆ∆(π˜
(N)) is given in (6.3).
Proof. Since Ct = 0 for t ≤ T , we set t = T + 1. We have∣∣Jˆ (N)1 (π˜(N), π∗, . . . , π∗)− Jˆ∆(π˜(N))∣∣ = ∣∣E[Ct(b˜N1 (t))] − E[Ct(bˆN1 (t))]∣∣.
Note that Ct(b) = Ct((s,m, y0, . . . , yt)) = e
λm, where m ∈ [0, L], is Lipschitz. There-
fore, the term in the above equation converges to zero by Proposition 6.6.
As a corollary of Proposition 6.4 and Theorem 6.7, we obtain the following result.
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Corollary 6.8. We have
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π∗, . . . , π∗) ≥ inf
pi′∈Π˜
Jˆ∆(π
′) = Jˆ∆(π
∗)
= lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π
∗, π∗, . . . , π∗),
where {π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ Π˜c1 is an arbitrary sequence of policies for Agent 1.
Now, we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 5.1) One can prove that for any policy pi(N) ∈ Π˜(N),
we have
inf
pii∈Π˜i
Jˆ
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i) = inf
pii∈Π˜c
i
Jˆ
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N (see the proof of [41, Theorem 2.3]). Hence, it is sufficient
to consider weakly continuous policies in Π(N) to establish the existence of ε-Nash
equilibrium in the new model.
We prove that, for sufficiently large N , we have
Jˆ
(N)
i (pi
(N,∗)) ≤ inf
pii∈Π˜c
i
Jˆ
(N)
i (pi
(N,∗)
−i , π
i) + ε(6.4)
for each i = 1, . . . , N . As indicated earlier, since the transition probabilities and the
one-stage cost functions are the same for all agents in the new game, it is sufficient to
prove (6.4) for Agent 1 only. Given ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, let π˜(N) ∈ Π˜c1 be such that
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π∗, . . . , π∗) < inf
pi′∈Π˜c1
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π
′, π∗, . . . , π∗) +
ε
3
.
Then, by Corollary 6.8, we have
lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π∗, . . . , π∗) = lim
N→∞
Jˆ∆(π˜
(N))
≥ inf
pi′
Jˆ∆(π
′)
= Jˆ∆(π
∗)
= lim
N→∞
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π
∗, π∗, . . . , π∗).
Therefore, there exists N(ε) such that for N ≥ N(ε), we have
inf
pi′∈Π˜c1
Jˆ
(N)
1 (π
′, π∗, . . . , π∗) + ε > Jˆ
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π∗, . . . , π∗) +
2ε
3
≥ Jˆ∆(π∗) + ε
3
≥ Jˆ (N)1 (π∗, π∗, . . . , π∗).
The result then follows from Proposition 6.1.
7. Infinite Horizon Cost Function. In this section, we extend Theorem 5.1
to games with infinite-horizon risk-sensitive cost functions; that is, a generic agent’s
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infinite-horizon risk-sensitive cost under the initial distribution κ0 and the N -tuple of
infinite-horizon policies pi(N,∞) = (π(1,∞), . . . , π(N,∞)) ∈ Π(N) is given by
W
(N,∞)
i (pi
(N,∞)) = Epi
(N,∞)
[
eλ
∑
∞
t=0 β
tm(sNi (t),u
N
i (t),d
(N)
t )
]
,
where, for each Agent j, π(j,∞) = {π(j,∞)0 , π(j,∞)1 , . . .} (i.e., infinitely many stochastic
kernels). Note that, by [43, Lemma 4.3], any infinite-horizon risk sensitive cost can be
approximated by finite T -horizon one with the error bound θβT+1 for some constant
θ > 0, which is independent of the policy pi(N,∞); i.e.,∣∣W (N,∞)i (pi(N,∞))−W (N)i (pi(N,∞))∣∣ ≤ θβT+1.(7.1)
Then, the following theorem is a consequence of (7.1) and Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 7.1. For any ε > 0, choose T such that θβT+1 < ε3 and let N(
ε
3 ) be
the constant in Theorem 5.1 for the finite horizon T . Then, for N ≥ N( ε3 ), the policy
pi(N,∞) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive game with N
agents, where pi(N,∞) = (π∞, . . . , π∞),
π∞ =
{
π∗0 , . . . , π
∗
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
T + 1-times
, πT+1, πT+2, . . .
}
,
π∗ = {π∗t }Tt=0 is the policy in the mean-field equilibrium of the T -horizon game, and
{πt}∞t=T+1 is some arbitrary policy.
8. Conclusion. This paper has considered discrete-time finite-horizon partially-
observed risk-sensitive mean-field games. We have first constructed an equivalent
game model whose states are the state of the original model plus the one-stage costs
incurred up to that time. In this new model, the finite-horizon risk-sensitive cost
function can be written in an additive-form as in the risk-neutral case. Then, letting
the number of agents go to infinity, we have first established the existence of a mean-
field equilibrium in the limiting mean-field game problem. We have then shown that
the policy in the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium
for similarly structured games with a sufficiently large number of agents. Finally, we
have extended our results to the case of infinite-horizon cost functions.
Appendix.
8.1. Continuous and Deterministic Equilibrium Policy. A common way
to establish Assumption 2-(b) is as follows. Suppose that, for the measure-flow µ in
mean-field equilibrium, there exists a unique minimizer az ∈ A of
C
µ
t (z, · ) +
∫
Z
J
µ
∗,t+1(z
′)ηµt (dz
′|z, · ) = Rt(z, · ),(8.1)
for each z ∈ Z and for all t. In addition, suppose that Ft : Z × A × Y → Z in (4.1)
is continuous. Note that uniqueness conditions analogous to (8.1) are quite common
in the mean field literature (see, e.g., [23, Assumption 4], [18, Assumption A5], [32,
Assumption H5], [16, Assumption A9]).
Under the condition of a unique minimizer to (8.1), one can prove that the policy
ϕ in Proposition 4.2 is deterministic and weakly continuous (see [42, Remark 5.2]).
Indeed, fix any t ≥ 0 and consider the policy ϕt at time t in ϕ. By the unique
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minimizer condition (8.1), we must have ϕt( · |z) = δft(z)( · ) for some deterministic
function ft : Z → A which minimizes Rt(z, · ); that is, mina∈ARt(z, a) = Rt(z, ft(z))
for all z ∈ Z. If ft is continuous, then ϕt is also weakly continuous. Hence, in order to
prove the assertion, it is sufficient to prove that ft is continuous. Suppose that zn → z
in Z. Note that lt( · ) = mina∈ARt( · , a) is continuous. Therefore, every accumulation
point of the sequence {ft(zn)}n≥1 must be a minimizer for Rt(z, · ). Since there exists
a unique minimizer ft(z) of Rt(z, · ), the set of all accumulation points of {ft(zn)}n≥1
must be the singleton {ft(z)}. This implies that ft(zn) converges to ft(z) since A is
compact. Hence, ft is continuous.
Recall that the mean-field equilibrium policy is given by
πt( · |g(t)) = ϕt( · |i(g(t))).
Hence, π is also a deterministic policy as i is a deterministic function. The function
i can be generated recursively using Ft : Z × A × Y → Z (t ≥ 0) in (4.1) and the
policy ϕ. Since Ft is continuous for all t and ϕ is also weakly continuous, we can
conclude that the mean-field policy π is deterministic and weakly continuous. Hence,
Assumption 2-(b) holds.
For instance, we can prove the existence of a unique minimizer to (8.1) and the
continuity of Ft for all t under the following conditions on the system components.
Suppose that B = Rd, Y = Rp, and A ⊂ Rm is convex. In addition, suppose that
q(ds′|s, a, µ) = ̺(s′|s, a, µ)ν(ds′) and l(dy|s) = ζ(y|s)ν(dy), where ν denotes the
Lebesgue measure. Assume that both ̺ and ζ are continuous and bounded, and ̺
and m are strictly convex in a, where m is the one-stage cost function of the original
problem. Then we have Ht(dy|z, a) = ht(y|z, a)ν(dy), where ht(y|z, a) is given by
ht(y|z, a) =
∫
B
∫
B
ζ(y|s)̺(s|s′, a, µt)ν(ds)z1(ds′),
where z1(ds
′) = z(ds′ × [0, L]). Similarly, we have
Ft(dx|z, a, y) =
∫
X
ft(s|s′, a, y)ν(ds)⊗ δm′+βtm(s′,a,µt)(dm)z(ds′, dm′)
ht(y|z, a) ,
where ft(s|s′, a, y) is given by ft(s|s′, a, y) = ζ(y|s)̺(s|s′, a, µt). Then, one can prove
that Ft is continuous. To show uniqueness of the minimizer to (8.1), note that
J
µ
∗,t+1(z) = inf
ϕ∈Φ
Eϕ
[ T+1∑
k=t+1
C
µ
k (z(k), a(k))
∣∣∣∣z(t+ 1) = z
]
= inf
pi∈Π
Epi
[ T+1∑
k=t+1
ck(x(k), a(k), µk)
∣∣∣∣x(t+ 1) ∼ z
]
=
∫
X
V∗,t+1(x)z(dx),
where
V∗,t+1(x) = inf
pi∈Π
Epi
[ T+1∑
k=t+1
ck(x(k), a(k), µk)
∣∣∣∣x(t+ 1) = x
]
.
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Hence, for any a ∈ A, (8.1) can be written as∫
X
ct(x, a, µt)z(dx) +
∫
Y
∫
X
V∗,t+1(x)Ft(z, a, y)(dx)Ht(dy|z, a)
=
∫
X
ct(x, a, µt)z(dx) +
∫
X
∫
B
V∗,t+1(s,m
′ + βtm(s′, a, µt))̺(s|s′, a, µt)ν(ds)z(ds′, dm′).
Note that
V∗,t+1(s,m) = e
λm inf
pi∈Π
eλE[
∑T
k=t+1 β
km(s(k),u(k),µ1,k)|s(k)=s],
and thus V∗,t+1(s,m) is strictly convex in m. Since m and ̺ are strictly convex in a,
the last expression is also strictly convex in a. Hence, there exists a unique minimizer
az ∈ A for (8.1).
8.2. Proof of Proposition 6.6. We prove the result by induction on t. The
claim trivially holds for t = 0 as L(b˜N1 (0)) = L(bˆN (0)) = λ0 for all N ≥ 1. Suppose
that the claim holds for t and consider t+ 1. Set supN≥1 ‖gN‖ =: L <∞ and define
TN (b,∆) :=
∫
A×Bt+1
gN (b
′)Pt(db
′|b, a,∆)π˜(N)t (da|b).
We can write∣∣L(b˜N1 (t+ 1))(gN )− L(bˆN (t+ 1))(gN )∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
Bt×P(Bt)
TN(b,∆)L(b˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(db, d∆)
−
∫
Bt×P(Bt)
TN(b,∆)L(bˆN (t), δ∆t)(db, d∆)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣L(b˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(TN )− L(bˆN (t), δ∆t)(TN )∣∣.
Note that, for any b ∈ Bt and (∆,∆′) ∈ P(Bt)2, we have
|TN(b,∆)− TN (b,∆′)| ≤ ωg
(
ωm(dBL(∆1,∆
′
1))
)
+ Lωq(dBL(∆1,∆
′
1)),
where ∆1 is the marginal distribution of s under ∆ (recall that b = (s,m, y
t)). Hence
the family {TN(b, · ) : b ∈ Bt, N ≥ 1} is uniformly bounded and equi-continuous.
Moreover, for any ∆ ∈ P(Bt), we have
ωT,∆(r) := sup
s,yt
sup
N≥1
sup
m,m′
|m−m′|≤r
|TN (s,m, yt,∆)− TN (s,m′, yt,∆)|
≤ sup
s,yt
sup
N≥1
sup
m,m′
|m−m′|≤r
ωg(|m−m′|) = ωg(r).
Hence, ωT,∆(r) → 0 as r → 0. Therefore, {TN} ⊂ Cb(Bt × P(Bt)) is a sequence
of functions such that the family
{
TN(b, · ) : b ∈ Bt, N ≥ 1)
}
is equi-continuous,
supN≥1 ‖TN‖ < ∞, and ωT,∆(r) → 0 as r → 0 for any ∆ ∈ P(Bt). We now prove
that
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(b˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(TN )− L(bˆN (t), δ∆t)(TN )∣∣ = 0,(8.2)
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which would then complete the proof. Indeed, we have∣∣L(b˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(TN )− L(bˆN (t), δ∆t)(TN )∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
Bt×P(Bt)
TN(b,∆)L(b˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(db, d∆)
−
∫
Bt×P(Bt)
TN(b,∆)L(b˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(db, d∆)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
Bt×P(Bt)
TN(b,∆)L(b˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(db, d∆)
−
∫
Bt×P(Bt)
TN(b,∆)L(bˆN (t), δ∆t)(db, d∆)
∣∣∣∣.(8.3)
First, note that since the family {TN( · ,∆t)}N≥1 ⊂ Cb(Bt) satisfies the hypothesis of
the proposition and the proposition is true for t, by induction hypothesis, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
Bt
TN (b,∆t)L(b˜N1 (t))(db) −
∫
Bt
TN (b,∆t)L(bˆN (t))(db)
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Hence, the second term in (8.3) converges to zero as N →∞.
Now, let us consider the first term in (8.3). To that end, define F := {TN(b, · ) :
b ∈ Bt, N ≥ 1)
}
. Note that F is a uniformly bounded and equi-continuous family of
functions on P(Bt), and therefore
lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
F∈F
∣∣F (∆˜(N)t )− F (∆t)∣∣
]
= 0
as L(∆˜(N)t )→ L(∆t) weakly. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
Bt×P(Bt)
TN (b,∆)L(b˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )(db, d∆)
−
∫
Bt×P(Bt)
TN (b,∆)L(b˜N1 (t), δ∆t)(db, d∆)
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
N→∞
∫
Bt
∣∣∣∣
∫
P(Bt)
TN(b,∆)L(∆˜(N)t |b˜N1 (t))(d∆|b)
−
∫
P(Bt)
TN(b,∆)L(δ∆t)(d∆)
∣∣∣∣L(b˜N1 (t))(db)
≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
E
[∣∣TN(b˜N1 (t), ∆˜(N)t )− TN (b˜N1 (t),∆t)∣∣
∣∣∣∣b˜N1 (t)
]]
≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
F∈F
∣∣F (∆˜(N)t )− F (∆t)∣∣
]
= 0.
This completes the proof.
REFERENCES
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
28 N. SALDI, T. BAS¸AR, AND M. RAGINSKY
[1] S. Adlakha, R. Johari, and G.Y. Weintraub, Equilibria of dynamic games with many
players: Existence, approximation, and market structure, Journal of Economic Theory,
156 (2015), pp. 269–316.
[2] C.D. Aliprantis and K.C. Border, Infinite Dimensional Analysis, Berlin, Springer, 3rd ed.,
2006.
[3] T. Bas¸ar, Decentralized multicriteria optimization of linear stochastic systems, IEEE. Trans.
Autom. Control, 23 (1978), pp. 233–243.
[4] , Two-criteria LQG decision problems with one-step delay observation sharing pattern,
Information and Control, 38 (1978), pp. 21–50.
[5] N. Bauerle and U. Rieder, More risk-sensitive Markov decision processes, Math. Oper. Res.,
39 (2014), pp. 105–120.
[6] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, and P. Yam, Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control
Theory, Springer, New York, 2013.
[7] P. Billingsley, Convergence of Probability Measures, New York: Wiley, 2nd ed., 1999.
[8] A. Biswas, Mean field games with ergodic cost for discrete time Markov processes.
arXiv:1510.08968, 2015.
[9] V.I. Bogachev, Measure Theory: Volume II, Springer, 2007.
[10] A. Budhiraja and A.P. Majumder, Long time results for a weakly interacting particle system
in discrete time, Stochastic Analysis and Applications, 33 (2015), pp. 429–463.
[11] P. E. Caines and A. C. Kizilkale, ǫ-Nash equilibria for partially observed LQG mean field
games with a major player, IEEE. Trans. Autom. Control, 62 (2017), pp. 3225–3234.
[12] P. Cardaliaguet, Notes on Mean-field Games, 2011.
[13] R. Carmona and F. Delarue, Probabilistic analysis of mean-field games, SIAM J. Control
Optim., 51 (2013), pp. 2705–2734.
[14] N. S¸en and P.E. Caines, Mean field games with partially observed major player and stochastic
mean field, in CDC 2014, Los Angeles, Dec. 2014.
[15] , ǫ-Nash equilibria for a partially observed mean field game with major player, in ACC
2015, Chicago, July 2015.
[16] , Mean field game theory with a partially observed major agent, SIAM J. Control Optim.,
54 (2016), pp. 3174–3224.
[17] , Nonlinear filtering theory for McKean-Vlasov type stochastic differential equations,
SIAM J. Control Optim., 54 (2016), pp. 153–174.
[18] , On mean field games and nonlinear filtering for agents with individual-state partial
observations, in ACC 2016, Boston, July 2016.
[19] D.Firoozi and P.E. Caines, ε-Nash equilibria for partially observed lqg mean field games with
major agent: Partial observations by all agents, in CDC 2015, Japan, Dec. 2015.
[20] B. Djehiche and H. Tembine, Risk-sensitive mean-field type control under partial observation,
in Stochastics of Environmental and Financial Economics, F.E. Benth and G. Di Nunno,
eds., Cham, 2016, Springer International Publishing, pp. 243–263.
[21] R. M. Dudley, Real Analysis and Probability, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[22] D. Firoozi and P. E. Caines, ǫ-Nash equilibria for major minor LQG mean field games with
partial observations of all agents. arXiv:1810.04369, 2019.
[23] D.A. Gomes, J. Mohr, and R.R. Souza, Discrete time, finite state space mean field games,
J. Math. Pures Appl., 93 (2010), pp. 308–328.
[24] D.A. Gomes and J. Sau´de, Mean field games models - a brief survey, Dyn. Games Appl., 4
(2014), pp. 110–154.
[25] O. Herna´ndez-Lerma, Adaptive Markov Control Processes, Springer-Verlag, 1989.
[26] O. Herna´ndez-Lerma and J.B. Lasserre, Discrete-Time Markov Control Processes: Basic
Optimality Criteria, Springer, 1996.
[27] K. Hinderer, Foundations of Non-stationary Dynamic Programming with Discrete Time Pa-
rameter, Springer-Verlag, 1970.
[28] J. Huang and S. Wang, A class of mean-field LQG games with partial information.
arXiv:1403.5859v1, 2014.
[29] M. Huang, Large-population LQG games involving major player: The Nash certainity equiv-
alence principle, SIAM J. Control Optim., 48 (2010), pp. 3318–3353.
[30] M. Huang, P.E. Caines, and R.P. Malhame, Distributed multi-agent decision-making with
partial observations: Asymptotic Nash equilibria, in Theory of Networks and Systems,
Japan, July 2006.
[31] M. Huang, P.E. Caines, and R.P. Malhame´, Large-population cost coupled LQG problems
with nonuniform agents: Individual-mass behavior and decentralized ǫ-Nash equilibria,
IEEE. Trans. Autom. Control, 52 (2007), pp. 1560–1571.
[32] M. Huang, R.P. Malhame´, and P.E. Caines, Large population stochastic dynamic games:
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
PARTIALLY OBSERVED DISCRETE-TIME RISK-SENSITIVE MEAN FIELD GAMES 29
Closed loop McKean-Vlasov sysyems and the Nash certainity equivalence principle, Com-
munications in Information Systems, 6 (2006), pp. 221–252.
[33] B. Jovanovic and R.W. Rosenthal, Anonymous sequential games, Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 17 (1988), pp. 77–87.
[34] H.J. Langen, Convergence of dynamic programming models, Math. Oper. Res., 6 (1981),
pp. 493–512.
[35] J. Lasry and P.Lions, Mean field games, Japan. J. Math., 2 (2007), pp. 229–260.
[36] J. Moon and T. Bas¸ar, Discrete-time decentralized control using the risk-sensitive perfor-
mance criterion in the large population regime: a mean field approach, in ACC 2015,
Chicago, Jul. 2015, pp. 4779–4784.
[37] J. Moon and T. Bas¸ar, Robust mean field games for coupled Markov jump linear systems,
International Journal of Control, 89 (2016), pp. 1367–1381.
[38] , Linear quadratic risk-sensitive and robust mean field games, IEEE. Trans. Autom.
Control, 62 (2017), pp. 1062–1077.
[39] K.R. Parthasarathy, Probability Measures on Metric Spaces, AMS Bookstore, 1967.
[40] D. Rhenius, Incomplete information in Markovian decision models, Ann. Statist., 2 (1974),
pp. 1327–1334.
[41] N. Saldi, T. Bas¸ar, and M. Raginsky, Markov-Nash equilibria in mean-field games with
discounted cost, SIAM J. Control Optim., 56 (2018), pp. 4256–4287.
[42] , Approximate Nash equilibria in partially observed stochastic games with mean-field
interactions, Math. Oper. Res., 44 (2019), pp. 1006–1033.
[43] , Approximate Markov-Nash equilibria for discrete-time risk-sensitive mean-field games.
arXiv, 2019 (to appear in Math. Oper. Res.).
[44] M. Tang and Q. Meng, Partially observed optimal control for mean-field SDEs.
arXiv:1610.02587v1, 2016.
[45] H. Tembine, Risk-sensitive mean-field-type games with Lp-norm drifts, Automatica, 59 (2015),
pp. 224–237.
[46] H. Tembine, Q. Zhu, and T. Bas¸ar, Risk-sensitive mean field games, IEEE. Trans. Autom.
Control, 59 (2014), pp. 835–850.
[47] C. Villani, Optimal transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009.
[48] A.A. Yushkevich, Reduction of a controlled Markov model with incomplete data to a problem
with complete information in the case of Borel state and control spaces, Theory Prob.
Appl., 21 (1976), pp. 153–158.
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
